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OLD ANSWERS TO NEW QUESTIONS: GPS SURVEILLANCE AND
THE UNWARRANTED NEED FOR WARRANTS
Tarik N. Jallad
Law enforcement officers rely on technology for surveillance
And as new technologies emerge, society can expect that those
charged with our day-to-day protection will also utilize the fruits
of science alongside the rest of us. But at what point on the
technological timeline do the limits we bestow on law enforcement
no longer adhere to the fundamental interests we all enjoy under
the Constitution? Can changes in technology render the
jurisprudence of the past obsolete? Although these questions have
a never-ending stream of application, this Recent Development
argues that the well-established Fourth Amendment precedent of
yesterday still applies to the GPS surveillance technology used
today.
1. INTRODUCTION
Have we, members of a free society, turned a blind eye to the
government's squandering of our constitutional liberties? Have
our courts, the true guards protecting us from those veiled under
the dark color of law, injudiciously watched as our intrinsic Fourth
Amendment' protections dissolved in plain sight? Consider the
following assertions, reflecting on the unfettered use of Global
Positioning System ("GPS") surveillance:
.J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2011. The
author wishes to thank Dr. Bonnie Jallad and Briar Schumann for their love and
support while writing this article.
'The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The sky is not falling-yet. But, if we continue to allow the Court's
Fourth Amendment law to be interpreted in a limited fashion that reads
the amendment's protections into oblivion, George Orwell's 1984 will
become a much more likely version of our future.2
The privacy violations arising from governmental abuse of GPS data
from cellular phones and vehicle tracking systems are vast, thus
legislative intervention is imperative.
[T]he question becomes whether technology has eroded the
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the
4U.S. Supreme Court. So far, the answer seems to be yes. ...
To some, this Orwellian future is no longer a sci-fi fantasy, but a
prophetic reality knocking on our door-or more accurately,
ringing the doorbell. This Recent Development, however, does not
share this view.' Rather, glancing only at the past few decades,
this Recent Development seeks to explain how the precedent
governing previous vehicle-tracking technologies still applies to
the devices currently used by law enforcement officers.
To fully explain the evolution of the Fourth Amendment's role
in vehicle tracking-namely as a constitutional protection
triggered if the surveillance is construed as a "search"-this
Recent Development is set out in three sections. By examining the
relevant tracking devices used in vehicle surveillance, "beepers"
and GPS, Part II illustrates that despite the technological variances,
both instruments procure essentially identical data. The
implications of this comparison prove fundamentally critical when
analogizing the established Fourth Amendment case law with
today's unsettled surveillance guidelines. Next, Part III describes
2 Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REv. 409, 465 (2007) (referring to GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984 (1949)).
3 Sarah Rahter, Note, Online and Locational Privacy: Privacy Implications of
GPS Tracking Technology, 4 ISJLP 755, 777 (Winter 2008).
4 April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting
Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court's Theory of the Public Space Under the
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 661, 663 (2005).
And arguably, in some respects this view is not alone. See, e.g., John S.
Ganz, Comment, It's Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need
Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1325 (2005); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Mvyths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801 (2004).
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the Fourth Amendment and its application in two Supreme Court
surveillance cases on point, albeit involving the more primitive of
the technologies: beepers. These cases, United States v. Knotts'
and United States v. Karo,' stand for the proposition that
surveillance of public information does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Part IV first examines the recent GPS litigation and
argues that the rationale arising from the majority of federal and
state courts properly adheres to the Supreme Court's "public
information" precedent. Part IV then continues by analyzing
United States v. Jones,' the most recent of the three cases heard by
a federal circuit court addressing the issue of modern day vehicle
tracking. Although the D.C. Circuit has yet to release its decision
in Jones, this Recent Development argues that the court should
follow the decisions of the other circuit courts and the majority of
state and federal courts by applying the Supreme Court's
precedent. Part V concludes by reiterating that although there are
technological differences between beepers and GPS, the same
public information is acquired-information unequivocally held
not to trigger the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF TRACKING DEVICES: DIFFERENT
TECHNOLOGIES, SIMILAR RESULTS
As a matter of vehicle surveillance, what was once used and
labeled a beeper has been technologically superseded by GPS. The
Fourth Amendment's text, however, has not evolved to comply
with society's scientific achievements, leaving the courts at times
to maintain the connection between our constitutional protections
and the emerging technologies that could not have been foreseen
years ago.' Accordingly, understanding the differences and
6 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
'468 U.S. 795 (1984).
" United States v. Jones, No. 08-3034, (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 18, 2009).
9See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 275 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(recognizing "the judiciary's role as the only effective guardian of Fourth
Amendment rights"); cf United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d I 140, 1152 (9th Cir.
2006) ("The fact of an increasing technological world is not lost upon us as we
consider the proper balance to strike between protecting an individual's right to
privacy and ensuring that the government is able to prosecute suspected
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similarities between the beeper and modem GPS is paramount in
order to appreciate their application in the analysis of Fourth
Amendment case law. A brief explanation of the workings of the
two technologies ensues.
A. Officer + Beeper = Vehicle Location
The beeper, as used by law enforcement officers before the
turn of the century, does not necessarily refer to the common
"pager" used by millions in the 1980s and 1990s as a means to
transmit numerical messages, although the technology is a helpful
analogue." Here, "[a] beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a
radio receiver."" Once a beeper was placed on a vehicle, 2 an
criminals effectively."); but cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 404 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("1 will not distort the words of the Amendment in order
to 'keep the Constitution up to date' or 'to bring it into harmony with the times.'
It was never meant that this Court have such power, which in effect would make
us a continuously functioning constitutional convention."). The legislature has
also played a continuous role in defining and limiting certain aspects of
electronic surveillance. See, e.g., The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (outlining under Title 111,
warrant procedures for certain domestic surveillance operations); The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(foreign intelligence procedures); The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (amending previous legislation
to take into account new computer technologies).
'o See generally Mary Bellis, History of Pagers and Beepers, ABOUT.COM,
http://inventors.about.com/od/pstartinventions/alpager.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
20 10) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). See generally Janice R. Oakes,
Note, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-Beeper Monitoring and the
Fourth Amendment: What Has Knotts Wrought?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1984).
In United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 728 F.2d 1514,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984), prior to the implementation of GPS in police
surveillance, the Court defined the beeper as follows:
An electronic tracking device-also called a "beeper," "beacon," or
"transponder"-is a miniature, battery-powered radio transmitter that
emits a recurrent signal at a set frequency. When monitored by
directional finders, the beeper provides information as to the location
and movement of the object to which it is attached. A beeper is
incapable of transmitting conversation or recording sounds. For this
reason, beepers do not fall within the definition of wiretapping devices.
[Vol-. 9: 351354
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officer was able to track the vehicle's movements without having
to physically see it. Essentially, by measuring the signal's
strength, law enforcement tailing a vehicle could determine their
approximate distance from the transmitter being followed.'
Accuracy and reliability, however, were not the beeper's forte.
Law enforcement agencies were sometimes faced with the
challenges of reduced range in congested areas 4 and the data
received by the officer only contained the whereabouts of the
vehicle, because the beeper was "incapable of transmitting
Butts, 710 F.2d at 1142-43 (internal citations omitted).
2 There are various discussions, both in and out of court, regarding the actual
installation of "beepers." See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th
Cir. 2007) (holding that a search had not occurred when a battery-powered GPS
device was installed on the exterior of a vehicle); United States v. Michael, 645
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981) (discussing tracking
device attached with a magnet in suspect's vehicle bumper); State v. Campbell,
759 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Or. 1988) ("Magnets in the transmitter held it to the
automobile, and the attachment was made without entering the vehicle."); see
also StarChase, http://www.starchase.org (featuring a projectile system that can
be used by the police to fire a dart containing a miniature GPS module at a
vehicle) (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology). Another concern in this respect, and outside the scope of
this article, is the constitutionality of the placement-which has generally been
held to pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See United States v. Berry, 300 F.
Supp. 2d 366, 368 n.2 (D. Md. 2004) ("The police may be guilty of a trespass
when they install a beeper, but the Supreme Court has held that the commission
of a trespass, without more, does not violate the Fourth Amendment."); see also
Eva Marie Dowdell, You Are Here!-Mapping the Boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment With GPS Technology, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 109,
I 17-21 (2005) (discussing various litigation on whether or not the installation
of a tracking device is a "seizure" under Fourth Amendment standards). The
scope of this article deals primarily with the "search" contention, i.e. whether or
not the conduct of tracking the device implicates the Fourth Amendment.
" Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1042; Berry, 300 F. Supp.2d at 367-68.
14 See Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth
Amendment: Knotts, Karo and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L.
REv. 277, 282 n.7 (1985) ("In congested urban areas, interference with the
reception of the beeper's signals may reduce its effective range to about two
blocks."). But see id. at n.7 (citing the government's reply brief in Karo, to
explain that "under normal operating conditions, a beeper's signal can be
monitored for a distance of two-to-four miles on an open road, and for up to
twenty miles away in the air").
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conversation or recording sounds."" Nonetheless, despite its
flaws, the beeper did its job: tracking vehicle locations.
B. Officer + GPS = Vehicle Locations
Flash forward to the world of the GPS."' No longer are
primitive radio signals being directly transmitted to nearby
surveillance authorities. Instead, all-powerful satellites in
uninterrupted planetary orbit beam pinpoint location data at the
user's request, allowing virtually anyone in the United States to
harness space-age technology with generally available handheld
gadgets." The process establishing the human-satellite
relationship, called "trilateration,"" calculates the time it takes for
a signal from a GPS receiver on land to reach three or more
"s Fishman, supra note 14, at 281 (quoting Butts, 710 F.2d at 1143).16 According to GPS.gov:
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a U.S.-owned utility that
provides users with positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services.
The U.S. Air Force develops, maintains, and operates the . . . 24
operating satellites that transmit one-way signals that give the current
GPS satellite position and time....
The user segment consists of the GPS receiver equipment, which
receives the signals from the GPS satellites and uses the transmitted
information to calculate the user's three-dimensional position and time.
The Global Positioning System, What is GPS?, http://www.gps.gov/
systems/gps/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" See Hutchins, supra note 2, at 419-21 (discussing the history of the twenty-
four satellites that make GPS possible, its applications, and a helpful layman's
example to demonstrate the technology used). Although this article repeatedly
mentions law enforcement as the "users" of GPS, the system is routinely
available to the public in a variety of applications. See The Global Positioning
System, GPS Services, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/index.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)
("GPS satellites provide service to civilian and military users. The civilian
service is freely available to all users on a continuous, worldwide basis."); see
infra. note 19.
'" See Fred Zahradnik, Trilateration in GPS, ABOUT.COM GUIDE,
http://gps.about.com/od/glossary/g/trilateration.htm ("Global Positioning System
(GPS) navigators use the mathematical technique of trilateration to determine
user position, speed, and elevation.") (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
[ol-. 9: 3 51356
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satellites in space." As the satellites' distances between each other
are preprogrammed, the location of the GPS receiver is determined
by calculating the different times between multiple satellites.
The technology is utterly impressive and seems light-years
more advanced when compared with the simpler beeper
mechanics. 2 ' But as used in a surveillance application,22 GPS
technology's similarity to beeper technology is apparent. For
example, GPS still requires the physical installation of the receiver
to the vehicle.2 ' And like the beeper, GPS just relays location data
to the surveillance authorities. It does not expose conversations or
record images for law enforcement. 24
' See generally How GPS Works, http://www.how-gps-works.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
20 See id
21 See supra Part H.A.
22 It should be noted that there are a multitude of uses for GPS, both for law
enforcement as well as individual consumers. For an idea of some of the viable
applications, see Ramya Shah, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth
Amendment Keep Up With Electronic Tracking Technology?, 2009 U. ILL. .L.
TECH. & POL'Y 281, 283-84 (2009) (listing navigation, stolen vehicle recovery,
vehicle dispatch, fleet management, military applications, and animal control as
just some of the uses of modern day GPS); see also People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1211 (N.Y. 2009) (Read, J., dissenting).
23 There are multiple devices that contain the capabilities to act as GPS
receivers. See, e.g., Derek P. Richmond, Can You Find Me Now?-Tracking the
Limits on Government Access to Cellular GPS Location Data, 16 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUs 283 (2007) (discussing GPS surveillance by the government
through individual cell phones); OnStar Technology, http://www.onstar.com/us_
english/jsp/explore/onstarbasics/technology.jsp (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). At issue here are
the GPS devices physically installed, like "beepers," to the exterior of a vehicle.
24 See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. At issue here is not
overhead satellite imagery providing a bird's-eye-view of the vehicle under
surveillance. The satellites used in GPS calculate numerical data alone. See
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d at
1142-43. That data is then interpreted to determine location. For a discussion
on satellite imagery, see generally Brian Craig, Online Satellite and Aerial
Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D. L. REv. 547 (2007); see also California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that the naked-eye aerial surveillance of
defendant's backyard was not a search under the Fourth Amendment); Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding warrantless aerial
SPRING 2010] 357
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However, relevant differences do exist, primarily in two
distinctive areas: accuracy and data volume capability. Unlike the
beeper, GPS remains accurate even from great distances, both in
congested areas and throughout various weather elements.2 ' And
the beeper's location estimation pales in comparison to satellite's
pinpoint accuracy. Furthermore, while the beeper requires at
least some physical proximity by officers to determine a vehicle's
whereabouts, GPS has the capability to single-handedly acquire
vehicle locations continuously over a long period of time.2 ' But
surveillance from a helicopter 400 feet above backyard). Additionally,
recording in-vehicle conversations is also outside the scope of this Recent
Development, and not involved in the GPS surveillance issue discussed here.
See In re U.S. Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral
Communications, 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining a private
company's obligation to assist the FBI with recording conversations using an in-
car telecommunication unit installed by the vehicle manufacturer); see also
supra note 22.
25 See Richard B. Langley, In Simple Terms, How Does GPS Work? (updated
Feb. 16, 2008), http://gge.unb.ca/Resources/HowDoesGPSWork.htmI (GPS "is
an all-weather system and is not affected by rain, snow, fog, or sand storms.")
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
26 See, e.g., Vehicle Tracking: GPS Tracking Key, http://www/vehicle-
tracking.com/product/gps-tracking/1 505.htmi (featuring a miniature GPS
tracking device with a horizontal accuracy of 2.5 meters) (last visited Feb 20,
2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp.2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005)
(discussing the two day GPS surveillance of defendant's travel to another state);
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding the
warrantless monitoring of a vehicle with a tracking device over a four-month
period); see also Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 2009). In
Connolly, the court examined GPS vehicle surveillance conducted over fifteen
days and noted that because "the location data is stored in computer files,"
Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 362, "even if the vehicle's route was not observed by
the police officers . . . the data may be queried to determine if the vehicle always
paused en route at a particular convenience store parking lot known to be a
location of frequent drug transactions at a particular time every evening."
Connolly, N.E.2d at 362, n.6. Arguably, these GPS features can be replicated by
officers in the field, albeit with more difficulty. Essentially, GPS does not make
the impossible possible, but like the millions of other technology driven
innovations, simplifies an already existing part of society. "Of course the
[Fourth Ajmendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no
more efficient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth."
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (citing Knorts, 460 U.S. at 283-84).
(Vot_. 9: 351358
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are these differences enough to justify rethinking Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence? Essentially, both beepers and GPS
produce similar results for the law enforcement user: vehicle
locations. Yes, the possibilities for abuse are more readily
attainable, but mere possibilities do not make a device more
intrusive nor increase society's expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.28  Unless the GPS capabilities are abused or
there is evidence that abuse is imminent, the current protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment sufficiently secure the
technological gap between beepers and GPS.
II1. THE SUPREME COURT AND YESTERDAY'S VEHICLE
SURVEILLANCE
The Fourth Amendment states that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....
Regrettably, the founders did not include a GPS provision or
beeper clause. To fill in the gaps, courts have made various
rulings, ensuring that the fundamental protections the Fourth
Amendment affords remain absolute.
A. The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Technology
By its very language, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
are only implicated when a "search" or "seizure" occurs. Absent
narrowly defined circumstances, the second part of the
28 See infra, notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia, 474
F.3d 994, and Judge Richard Posner's view that while GPS has the capabilities
to be highly intrusive, its use within today's society does not paint a picture of
abuse).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 See id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("A search
compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual
of dominion over his or her person or property."); WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH,
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1, 2 (2d ed. 2003) ("[BJefore spinning our wheels in
an exercise of futility inquiring whether the Fourth Amendment has been
satisfied, we must pause at the threshold to inquire whether the Fourth
Amendment is even applicable so as to require satisfaction.").
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amendment, the "Warrant Clause,"' mandates acquiring a warrant
to justify the "search" or "seizure" as lawful. 2 However, if neither
a "search" nor "seizure" occurs, the amendment simply does not
apply.3 Logically then, the key factor is determining if and at
what point electronic surveillance employed by law enforcement
constitutes a search.
One of the first cases to address the implications of technology-
enhanced surveillance under the Fourth Amendment was Olmstead
v. United States.34 Despite the increasingly protective precedent up
to that point," the court noted that "[t]he amendment itself shows
that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house,
his papers, or his effects."" As "an actual physical invasion" had
not occurred, it followed that there was no "search.""
However, the 1967 case Katz v. United States" marked a
significant turning-point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with
regards to electronic surveillance.3' Disposing of the traditional
3 The "Warrant Clause" reads: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32 See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996 ("But of course the presumption in favor of
requiring a warrant, or for that matter the overarching requirement of
reasonableness, does not come into play unless there is a search or seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
33 See id. As discussed below, this article focuses primarily on the "search"
element of the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 12 (discussing various cases
and articles regarding the possibility that the installation of a tracking device
constitutes a "seizure").
34 277 U.S. 438 (1928). At issue in O/mstead was whether the government's
telephone wiretapping of the defendant, a suspected liquor smuggler, in order to
record conversations amounted to a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 455-56.
35 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
36 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
37 Id. at 466.
38 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
' Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. At issue in Katz was whether an electronic listening
device placed on the outside of a phone booth in order to record specific
360 IVOL-. : 351
GPS Surveillance
question of whether or not a physical invasion had occurred, the
Supreme Court in Katz explained that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable
searches and seizures."4 0 Additionally, Katz suggested a two-part
test, albeit in the concurring opinion, to assess the objective
reasonableness of an individual's subjective expectation of
privacy: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "41 Although
Justice Harlan's two-pronged proposition is taken from his Katz
concurrence, courts consistently apply the test when determining
whether a search has occurred.4 2
B. It is "Knotts " a Search
Less than two decades after Katz, the Supreme Court decided
in United States v. Knotts43 whether a search had occurred after
officers installed a beeper to track the whereabouts of illicit drug
manufacturers.4 4 Answering the Katz inquiry regarding the
objective reasonableness of an individual's expectation of
privacy,4" the Court ultimately declared that a search had not
conversations made by the defendant fell under the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 350-51.
40 Id. at 353.
41 Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119,
1125 (9th Cir. 1999); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 340-41(2000); Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
43 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
44 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. In Knotts, officers attached a beeper to the inside
of a five-gallon chloroform container that was subsequently purchased by the
defendants and put inside their vehicle. Id. at 278.
45 See id at 281:
The first question is whether the individual, by his conduct, has
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,"-whether in
the words of the Katz majority, the individual has show that "he seeks
to preserve [something] as private." The second question is whether
the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable"-whether, in the words of the
Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is
"justifiable" under the circumstances.
SPRING 2010] 361
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occurred."6 By first focusing on the "diminished expectation of
privacy in an automobile,"" the Court stated that the beeper
tracking was akin to the physical following of the automobile on
public roads.4X Essentially, someone traveling by vehicle on public
thoroughfares does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements."4 9 Furthermore, the Court held that the use of
technology did not alter the Fourth Amendment analysis, a
rationale that should resonate today: "Insofar as respondent's
complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the
beeper enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it
simply has no constitutional foundation. We have never equated
police efficiency with unconstitutionality. And we decline to do so
now."50
Additionally, the Knotts Court was faced with allegations of
the possible abuse of overzealous officers using technology-
enhanced surveillance techniques. Similar to the baseless
assertions today,' the defendant cautioned that with the unfettered
use of enhanced surveillance, any citizen could be subject to
twenty-four hour surveillance. However, instead of exacerbating
a mere possibility, the Court stuck to the facts: "[Tihe 'reality
hardly suggests abuse,'" and "if such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be
Id. (internal citations omitted).
46 Id. at 286.
47 Id. at 281; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality
opinion):
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and its contents are in plain view.
Cardwell 417 U.S. at 590.
48 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
49 id.
5o Id. at 284; cf Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 744-45 (holding that a
"different constitutional result" was not required just because a "telephone
company ha[d] decided to automate" their dialing system); see also Garcia, 474
F.3d 99, discussed infra Part IV.
51 See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 2, at 465.
52 Knotis, 460 U.S. at 283.
362 [Vot-. 9  351
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time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable.""
As discussed below, United States v. Knotts is not alone in
finding that employing an advanced means of surveillance does not
necessarily conjure up the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
C. Tracking a "Karo" on Public Roads? No Warrant Required
Just over a year after the Court decided Knotts, the Supreme
Court took up another beeper surveillance question. Although
relatively similar to the beeper surveillance exhibited in Knotts, the
tracking in United States v. Karo54 involved many more locations,
including inside the home." Essentially, two pertinent revelations
can be taken from Karo. First, declaring that no "search" or
"seizure" had occurred by the installation of the monitoring
devices, the Court reaffirmed the principles behind Knotts by
separating notions of "potential" invasions of privacy from
"actual[] invasions of privacy," the former of which has never been
held to constitute a search.5 "It is the exploitation of technological
advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment," the Court said,
"not their mere existence."' Second, the Karo Court reiterated the
importance of privacy within an individual's home, finding that a
distinct line was crossed once the beeper began signaling locations
5 Id. at 283-84 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978))
(emphasis added).
54 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
" See id.. at 708-11. In Karo, a beeper had also been placed in a container to
track illicit drug manufacturers. Id. This time, officers used physical
surveillance as well as the beepers signals to follow the container over the
course of weeks and through many locations including various private
residences. Id.
5 6 Id. at 712; see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, n.
5 (1986) ("Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case,
not by extravagant generalizations."). The Court also made little of the
constitutional implications of the attachment of the beeper. "At most," the Court
said, "there was a technical trespass on the space occupied by the beeper."
Karo, 498 U.S. at 713.
5 Karo, 468 U.S. at 712; see also United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998
(7th Cir. 2007) (noting the concerns posed by the abuse of GPS capabilities are
"momentous," but that they are not currently taking place).
SPRING 2010] 363
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
within the private residence, a location not open to visual
surveillance."
Overall, Karo stands for the proposition that warrantless beeper
surveillance, with its minimal intrusive means of gathering
location data along public roads, is not considered a "search.""
However, once a vehicle passes into the private sphere, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment may be triggered, suggesting
the possible need to obtain a warrant."
IV. TRACKING GPS BEHIND COURTROOM DOORS: COMPETING
ARGUMENTS
Although the Supreme Court has yet to speak directly on the
issue of GPS surveillance in the manner that beepers were
addressed, both state and federal courts have grappled with many
occasions where the use of GPS surveillance has been called into
question. The growing trend thus far, particularly within the
federal circuits, follows the Supreme Court's beeper jurisprudence,
declaring that GPS surveillance is not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. This portrait, however, is far from
complete, and those advocating stricter limitations on GPS
tracking do raise reasonable concerns.
As of this writing, a federal court has not held that the use of
GPS surveillance requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
Three states,"' however, have interpreted their state constitutions
' Karo, 468 U.S. at 716; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001) ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the
house.' ") (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
5 Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
60 Id. at 714-16.
6' A fourth state, Oregon, has previously held that the warrantless use of
tracking devices was precluded by Oregon's Constitution. See State v.
Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988). Campbell, decided shortly after the
beeper cases yet substantially before the GPS surveillance era, withdrew from
the use of the "expectation of privacy" formulation established in Katz. Id. at
1044. Rather, the court relied on a more narrow state doctrinal approach to
construe the tracking device as a "search" that violated the "web of rules that are
meant to protect the privacy interests of the people" of the state. Id. at 1045
(internal quotations omitted). Presumably, GPS falls within the scope of
Oregon's definition of "search," although this issue has not yet been litigated
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otherwise: Washington," Massachusetts," and New York.' As
their individual analyses sometimes travel outside of the Fourth
Amendment, their authoritative guidance is limited since state
courts are free to afford broader protections under their own
constitutions.6 ' Nonetheless, these cases present arguably valid
concerns that federal courts, still undecided on the Fourth
Amendment's role in GPS surveillance, may take into
consideration.
On the other end of the spectrum, the majority of courts have
likened GPS to the Supreme Court's beeper analysis seen only a
few decades back. While most decisions in this regime, like the
minority, come from state courts crafting their opinions around
state constitutional jurisprudence," various lower federal courts
there. For consistency, this article highlights only the state courts that have
directly litigated the GPS surveillance question.
62 State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (stating in dicta
that GPS was a technological substitute for traditional police surveillance and
was a "search" under the Washington Constitution). The Jackson court made
clear that its decision in no way involved the Fourth Amendment, id. at 222, n.
1, and was based on Article 1, Section 7 of its state constitution, which is
patently dissimilar: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
63 Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009)
(departing from the "search" inquiry altogether and holding that the monitoring
of a GPS device was a "seizure" under the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights). In Connolly, the court relied heavily on the fact that not only had the
officers entered the vehicle to install the GPS device, but that the battery in the
engine compartment was used as the power source. Id. at 369.
64 People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that the New
York Constitution requires a warrant before police may conduct GPS
surveillance).
65 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977); see also Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Each State has
power to impose higher standards governing police practices under state law
than is required by the Federal Constitution."); Robert M. Pitler, Independent
State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of
Appeals' Quest br Principled Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. I (1996).
6See, e.g., Stone v. State, 941 A.2d 1238, 1249-50 (Md. App. 2008) (noting
that GPS tracking was "simply the next generation of tracking science and
technology . . . to which the Knotts Fourth Amendment analysis directly
applies"); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
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have also conclusively found that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated by GPS surveillance."7 And unlike the minority, federal
circuits have begun to respond, not just to the arguments set forth
in their individual fact patterns, but also to the arguments
advocating a warrant requirement for GPS surveillance.
Regardless of their opposing beliefs, an analysis shows that both
the minority and majority opinions struggle with the same two
issues.
A. Beeper vs. GPS: Do Their Differences Make a Difference on
Public Roads?
The first argument that can be derived from the state courts and
critics of warrantless GPS surveillance is the notion that GPS
technology is not comparable to the beeper. Essentially, it is
argued that Knotts and Karo do not adequately account for GPS's
that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when "the police used a GPS
device to obtain information ... that was visible to the general public"). It
should be noted that other states have also held that tracking devices do not
amount to a "search," albeit in decisions not involving GPS. See, e.g., People v.
Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the
tracking occurred on public roads); Osburn v. State, 44. P.3d 523 (Nev. 2002)
(upholding the warrantless installation and monitoring of a tracking device
under Nevada Constitution because defendant "had neither a subjective nor an
objective expectation of privacy in the bumper of his vehicle").
67 See, e.g., United States v. Eberle, 993 F. Supp. 794, 798 (D. Mont. 1998)
aff'd sub nom., United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that electronic tracking devices placed on defendant's truck as part of drug
surveillance operation did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights);
United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp.2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004) (remaining
undecided about the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS surveillance, but
noting that "GPS merely records electronically what the police could learn if
they were willing to devote the personnel necessary to tail a car around the
clock"); United States v. Williams, 650 F. Supp.2d 633, 668 (W.D. Ky. 2009)
(concluding that "no search warrant or other court order was required to permit
the officers to lawfully attach the electronic tracking devices to the exterior" of
defendants' automobiles); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp.2d 425, 467-68
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement
officers' action of attaching a GPS device to defendant's vehicle and conducting
two-day surveillance, without a warrant, did not constitute a search or seizure
because the defendant had not expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of his
vehicle on a public roadway).
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more intrusive use." Where on one hand, the beeper requires some
aspect of physical proximity,6' GPS is automated and can be left to
continuously record location data for days and possibly months.70
Under this reasoning, GPS cannot be likened to the traditional
visual surveillance that beepers were said to augment."
Essentially, this argument assumes that because GPS is able to
acquire vast amounts of data, it follows that it is more intrusive,
despite the fact that the data is all public information.12  This
assertion, however, is simply not supported by precedent. As
discussed earlier, the only Supreme Court cases that are closely
related, Knotts and Karo, emphasized that tracking cannot be a
search as long as it involves information out in the public, and that
enhanced technology did not alter this long-standing rule as
"x See Otterberg, supra note 4, at 696; Dowdell, supra note 12;
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass. 2009).
6 See Shah, supra note 22, at 290 (noting that beepers require "constant
monitoring"); Ganz, supra note 5, at 1328; Connollv, 913 N.E.2d at 367, n.l I
("The [beeper] signal must be followed closely by officers conducting
surveillance, and is not transmitted to a computer system."); see also State v.
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) ("[W]hen a GPS device is attached to a
vehicle, law enforcement officers do not in fact follow the vehicle.")
70 See supra note 27 (listing cases involving various lengths of GPS
surveillance); Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 362 ("Since the location data is stored in
computer files, it may be kept indefinitely, and new information based on the
data obtained regarding a vehicle's past locations may be generated at any
time."); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (noting the virtual impossibility for police to
maintain "uninterrupted 24-hour surveillance" with traditional surveillance).
71 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) ("Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology
afforded them."); see Otterberg, supra note 4, at 696 (claiming that GPS
produces a "record virtually impossible to obtain through visual surveillance or
even beeper-attendant surveillance"); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (stating that GPS
devices are not "sense augmenting" and they do not "merely equate[] to
following [an individual] on public roads").
72 See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009) ("The
massive invasion of privacy entailed by the prolonged use of the GPS device [is]
inconsistent with even the slightest reasonable expectation of privacy.");
Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 ("[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with
a GPS device is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great
deal about an individual's life.").
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applied to vehicle tracking." To date, the Supreme Court has not
departed from this analysis, even considering more recent cases
that have addressed technological advances in the realm of Fourth
Amendment searches.
For example, in Kyllo v. United States," the Supreme Court
found the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to detect
heat dissipation on the outside of an individual's house to be a
"search" and therefore unconstitutional." Kyllo, however, clearly
limited its holding to a technological intrusion of the home, an area
"at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment," and not to the
public highways exposed to GPS-a place where travelers retain
"no reasonable expectation of privacy." And Kyllo's holding,
suggesting that it is limited to technology not in general public
use,78 cannot reasonably be applied to GPS surveillance, which is
commonly used by the public." Furthermore, to say that the
technological method used alters an individual's "expectation of
privacy," despite the same information being acquired, is untenable
and not supported by any constitutional foundation."o
7 See supra Part Ill.
74 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
7 Id. at 40.
76 Id at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974) (plurality opinion). The Seventh Circuit also noted that Kyllo was
unpersuasive in this regard. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir.
2007). In Garcia, the court noted that in Kvilo, the technology provided "a
substitute for a form of search unequivocally governed by the Fourth
Amendment." Id. With GPS, however, the technology substituted "following a
car on a public street," which is "unequivocally not a search" under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
" See Ky//o, 533 U.S. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a devices
that is not in general public use, to explore the details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
7 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
'o See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979) (holding that a
technological upgrade did not alter the "expectation of privacy" inquiry). This
does not imply that an aggregation of public information, by whatever method,
creates no ethical concern. But it remains the court's duty to interpret the
Constitution, and under the Fourth Amendment, there simply is no violation that
arises. See Daniel Solove, Justice Scalia's Dossier: Interesting Issues about
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Should officers be prohibited from upgrading their technology,
relying only on beeper technology to perform warrantless
surveillance? Or perhaps officers should be forced to maintain
pursuit of vehicles under GPS surveillance so that their
surveillance resembles the constitutionally upheld tracking of the
past. Maybe officers should be limited to surveillance only on
weekdays. Regardless, it is not possible to draw a line that
transcends technological evolution while still faithfully adhering to
the constitutional holding that when you travel, you are exposing
your location to the public." Acquiring such information is not a
"search" and does not require a warrant. 2
Privacy and Ethics, CONCURRING OPINIoNs, Apr. 29, 2009,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/04/justicescalias_2.html
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The
"expectation of privacy" inquiry, enunciated in Katz, and applied to the public
sphere has long been settled. In fact, a contrary proposition goes directly against
the Constitutional precedent: "A person traveling in his automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy." Knotts, 460 U.S. at
281. This of course is not to say that there is no expectation of privacy in a
vehicle. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979); New York v.
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986); Dorothy J. Glancy, Symposium Articles:
Privacv on the Open Road, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 295 (2004). Rather, only that
traveling on public roads is knowledge that does not implicate constitutional
privacy protections. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1204 (N.Y. 2009)
(Smith, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that some devices are too modern and
sophisticated to be used freely in police investigation is not a defensible rule of
constitutional law.").
" See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203-04 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("The attempt to
find in the Constitution a line between ordinary, acceptable means of
observation and more efficient, high-tech ones that cannot be used without a
warrant seems to me illogical, and doomed to fail."). One may also consider
that in some situations, GPS's sheer volume of data may not even be as
'informative" as traditional police surveillance. Where GPS relays only
location data to be later disseminated and interpreted, an officer traditionally
may be able to make more detailed first-hand observations. Presume, for
instance, a scenario in which an individual makes a series of stops in his vehicle,
each for a few minutes. With GPS, the data would show where the individual
stopped and for how long, but nothing more. Officers would have to interpret
the recorded location points to make any circumstantial connections. Now
consider an officer following that same individual. Observing first-hand, the
officer may gather information impossible for the GPS to acquire, such as an
individual picked-up at one of the stops, disposal of a murder weapon, a drug
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This argument was recently tested in United States v. Pineda-
Moreno." In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit was asked to
determine if a Drug Enforcement Agency's ("DEA") four-month
vehicle-tracking operation should be construed as a search. 4
Contending that he was subject to a warrantless "search," the
defendant argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
because the GPS device was "not generally used by the public.""'
Making the argument discussed above," the defendant asserted
that the decision in Kyllo supersedes the foregoing analysis under
Knotts and the various beeper cases." The Pineda-Moreno Court,
however, rejected the defendant's assertion. "The only information
the DEA agents obtained," the court said, "was a log of the
locations where [the defendant's] car traveled"-information akin
to what could arguably be acquired through visual surveillance."
Technology did not simply alter what was already available in the
public domain. The Pineda-Moreno court concluded, quoting
verbatim, the Knotts language decades ago:
Insofar as [Pineda-Moreno's] complaint appears to be simply that
scientific devises such as the [tracking devices] enabled the police to be
more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional
foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with
unconstitutionality and decline to do so now. 9
sale, and so on. It is not hard to surmise that the latter scenario involves a more
"informative" and "intrusive" method of surveillance, yet it can unquestionably
be conducted without a warrant. For examples of GPS surveillance that have
helped police fight crime, see Ganz, supra note 5, at 1330-32.
12 Of course a different and more plausible suggestion would be to simply
require officers to acquire a warrant before conducting GPS surveillance. On its
face, this seems like a reasonable idea, but it wholly undermines the precedent
stating that this public knowledge surveillance is not a "search."
x3 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
84 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213.
15 Id. at 1216.
86 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
87 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
8 Id.
' Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (alterations
in original). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (finding that the
constitutional analysis did not change when a more technological method was
used to acquire the same information). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit took a
page from Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit, discussed infra. following their
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B. Big Brother Surveillance: Possibility or Reality
The second concern stressed by those advocating the necessity
of warrants, involves the fear that officers may now conduct
twenty-four hour surveillance of everyone, everywhere, and at all
times, entirely without judicial oversight." It is argued that
compared to beepers, which the Supreme Court had not required a
warrant to install, GPS technology turned the "merely possible"
into the "entirely practicable."" Support for this premise allegedly
comes from Knotts itself.2 As the statement has arguably been
misconstrued, it seems prudent to quote the Knotts Court in its
entirety:
Respondent ... expresses the generalized view that the result of the
holding sought by the Government would be that "twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without
judicial knowledge or supervision." But the fact is that the "reality
hardly suggests abuse," if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices
as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles
may be applicable.93
This quotation is not an Orwellian forewarning that critics cite to
support their assertion that society is now under widespread
assertion that if the government began to institute "mass surveillance of
vehicular movements, it will be time enough" then to readdress the issue. Id.
(quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007)).
90 See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-1200; State v. Jackson,
76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003); Hutchins, supra note 2, at 440; Otterberg, supra
note 4, at 682-83.
"' Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
92 See id. at 1200; Shah, supra note 22, at 293; Hutchins, supra note 2, at 457;
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Who Knows Where You've Been?
Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators,
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 317 (2004); Susan J. Walsh and Ivan J. Dominguez,
Privacy and Technology: Law Enforcement's Secret Use of GPS Devices, THE
CHAMPION, May 12, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.criminaljustice.org
/public.nsf/0 I c I e7698280d20385256d0b00789923/6666338cb48c6cf9852575e6
00629cOc?OpenDocument (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
93 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84 (quoting Brief for Respondent, at 9 (footnote
omitted); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)) (internal
citations omitted).
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surveillance." Rather, the Court in Knotts was referencing the
Respondent 's cautioned protest. The Court implied that there may
be an issue if such surveillance occurs, and that, at that time,
different constitutional principles may be applicable. Thus far,
there is no evidence that any of this "abuse" has occurred, as each
case has involved surveillance of "an individual suspect, not
dragnet-type or mass surveillance.""
This argument was addressed directly by the first federal
circuit to rule on GPS surveillance. In United States v. Garcia,"
Judge Richard Posner and the Seventh Circuit attempted to
reconcile whether-and if so, why-the use of GPS surveillance
disturbed the settled precedent involving beepers.97 Looking
chronologically from traditional visual surveillance, then to beeper
monitoring, and finally to GPS tracking, the Garcia court seemed
to draw a line between technological "capability" and "reality."
The critical difference between enhanced surveillance "on the one
hand and following suspects around in a car on the other," the
court stated, is that the "new technologies enable, as the old .. . do
not, wholesale surveillance."" Judge Posner believed, however,
that the "capability" had not yet crossed the threshold into
9 See, e.g., Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199-1200; Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223;
Hutchins, supra note 2, at 440; Ottcrberg, supra note 4, at 682-83.
95 See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1207 (Read, J., dissenting); cf Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) (noting an increase in "evidence that police
forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens
seriously").
9 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). The factual makeup of United States v.
Garcia consisted of a methamphetamine manufacturer, his Ford Tempo, and
GPS surveillance that led law enforcement to a large tract of land containing the
defendant's illicit drug equipment and materials. See id at 995.
97 id.
9x Id. at 998. The Garcia court envisioned the possibilities of GPS
surveillance:
One can imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to thousands
of cars at random, recovering the devices, and using digital search
techniques to identify suspicious driving patterns. One can even
imagine a law requiring all new cars to come equipped with the device
so that the government can keep track of all vehicular movement in the
United States.
Id.
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"reality," and until then, the Fourth Amendment "cannot sensibly
be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the
twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth."99  But,
"[s]hould government someday decide to institute mass
surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to
decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to
treat such surveillance as a search.""o
C. United States v. Jones
The most recent case asked to determine the constitutionality
of warrantless GPS surveillance is United States v. Jones.'o'
Although the D.C. Circuit has yet to rule on this question, the facts
and arguments easily fit into the analytical framework discussed
above and applied by the majority of courts. Jones involved the
multi-state covert surveillance of multiple defendants convicted of
various drug-related offenses.0 2  Among other investigative
methods used, officers installed a GPS tracking device on Jones's
Jeep to record his movements.' Claiming that this monitoring
was unconstitutional, Jones's appeal closely follows the critics'
assertions previously mentioned. Jones stresses that GPS is not
comparable to beeper technology in that "GPS is akin to having a
thousand police officers standing and monitoring you as you drive
by."'O4 But even conceding their technological differences, the
diminished "expectation of privacy" an individual has on public
roads is not altered when applying a million-police-officer
analogy.' 5 And the fact that the "casual observer of a public event
cannot come close to ascertaining the amount of data and analysis
that a computer can""' does not disrupt the precedent either.
9 Id.
'" Id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983); cf
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 ("This reality hardly suggests
abuse; and if abuse occurs, there will be time enough to deal with it.").
'o' United States v. Jones, No. 08-3034 (D.C. Cir. Filed Feb. 18, 2009).
102 See United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp.2d 71, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2006).
103 Id. at 74.
'0 Brief of Appellants Jones and Maynard, at 19, United States v. Jones, No.
08-3034 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
1os See supra Part IV.A.
106 Appellant's Brief, at 63, Jones, No. 08-3034.
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Like the other GPS cases, Jones attempts to establish GPS as a
more intrusive means of surveillance, warranting Fourth
Amendment protections. And like its analogous cases, Jones
claims that the public surveillance doctrine should be altered
because technology has now provided the government with the
capability to cheaply, effectively, and easily gather astonishing
amounts of data on individuals. But how Jones proceeds to assert
its distaste-and ultimately its distrust-of government
surveillance methods does not accurately follow Fourth
Amendment precedent. One day the Supreme Court may decide to
depart from the established line of surveillance jurisprudence;
however, as it stands, the D.C. Circuit should adhere to the Court's
precedent and join the other federal circuits and the majority of
state courts in affirming the warrantless use of GPS surveillance.
V. CONCLUSION
This Recent Development argues that the aforementioned cases
sufficiently and accurately furnish all that is currently needed to
overlay the technological gaps GPS has seemingly entrenched into
the Fourth Amendment's evolving jurisprudence. Often repeated,
these judicial precepts faithfully adhere to the Constitution while
proclaiming that GPS surveillance has the unquestionable
"capability" to instill the ominous privacy-less future, but that
today's "reality" speaks of a disparate-albeit neighboring-truth.
The fact is that the information a traveler reveals on public roads,
is just that: public. Whether that information is surreptitiously
gathered by direct observation, semi-distant following, or
interpreting location data points, the Constitution, as delineated by
the Supreme Court, has laid a foundation that is upheld today.
Under individual state constitutions, states are free to afford more
protections via their Fourth Amendment corollary than the federal
constitution provides. Indeed, as discussed above, some have done
so. Like many other aspects of technology, the future is
illuminated with possibilities that could not have been foreseen.
However, despite the increased feasibility technology creates,
concerns should abate until such ideas become more than a
hypothetical fantasy. The Fourth Amendment has not fallen
behind technology. Law enforcement's use of it is what could
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create the void, but as each vehicle tracking case thus far has
shown, officers have been using technology to more efficiently
control crime and not to conduct mass surveillance of individuals
nationwide.
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